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Taxation and Business Cycles
Abstract
Implementation and collapse of exchange rate pegging schemes are recurrent events.
A currency crisis (pegging) is usually followed by an economic downturn (boom). This
essay explains why a benevolent government should pursue ﬁscal and monetary poli-
cies that lead to those recurrent currency crises and subsequent periods of pegging.
It is shown that the optimal policy induces a competitive equilibrium that displays
a boom in periods of below average devaluation and a recession in periods of above
average devaluation. A currency crisis (pegging) can be understood as an optimal
policy answer to a recession (boom).
JEL: E31, F31, F41.
1 Introduction
Implementation and collapse of exchange rate pegging schemes are recurrent events.
From Latin America to East Asia, Europe and Africa, several countries have experi-
enced episodes in which pegging schemes were either changed or temporarily aban-
doned and later reinstated. This research investigates why governments optimally
choose to pursue policies that lead to those periodic interventions and subsequent
breakdowns.
Previous studies showed that currency crises are frequently followed by a fall below
the trend in output and consumption and a real depreciation of the domestic currency.
Evidence that the reverse facts plus a deterioration of the current account often
accompany a pegging is also available. A model aimed at explaining the recurrent
pattern of exchange rate policies should be able to mimic some of that body of
empirical evidence. This research also achieved this goal.
The environment studied in this paper is a cash-credit two sector (tradable and
non tradable) small open economy without physical capital. This paper builds on
Lucas and Stokey’s [24] seminal work on optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy. The
problems of selecting the optimal monetary and exchange rate policies when tax
rates are endogenous but not fully state contingent are addressed.
The recurrent pattern of pegging schemes can be easily explained. The optimal
policies prescribe a simple behavior for the nominal exchange rate. Despite the fact
that the government could successfully pursue a rule of a constant and low devaluation
rate, this variable is a non constant function of the economy’s state. Hence, as the
state of the economy changes, the devaluation rate oscillates. That will lead to the
implementation and collapse of exchange rate pegging policies.
1Understanding the links between exchange rate policy and business cycles is more
challenging. In periods of high public expenditures, the devaluation will be higher
than in other times. The intuition for this ﬁnding is simple. In states where govern-
ment expenditures are relatively high, the optimal policies will prescribe a combina-
tion of higher taxation and debt issuing. Since tax rates are not fully state contingent,
a possible way to raise additional tax revenue is through inﬂation. Thus, a higher
inﬂation level will determine a higher rate of devaluation of the domestic currency.
A positive technological shock that leads to an output rise will reduce public ex-
penditures as fraction of GDP. Hence, the previous reasoning shows that currency
devaluation and technological shocks are negatively correlated.
It is now possible to understand why the model succeeds in mimicking most of
the aforementioned stylized facts. For simplicity, assume for a while that tax rates
are exogenous. Consider a pegging episode. In response to shocks that decrease
the ﬁscal deﬁcit and increase the productivity, the optimal policy will prescribe a
decrease in the devaluation rate. The higher productivity will stimulate the economic
activity and lead to higher output. The combination of a lower devaluation rate
and a higher output will generate an income eﬀect. Therefore, people will increase
their consumption. That increase will be large enough to induce a current account
deﬁcit. Since the higher demand for tradables can be partially oﬀset by imports,
the real exchange rate appreciates. These are some of the stylized facts associated
with a currency peg. In a similar fashion, shocks that increase the ﬁscal deﬁcit and
reduce productivity will lead to a higher devaluation and will induce the empirical
regularities associated with a currency crisis.
Most of the stylized facts are indeed reproduced when the taxation is endogenous.
The only exception is the behavior of the real exchange rate. The main factor behind
this departure from data is that optimal tax rates (other than inﬂation) are roughly
constant. Therefore, public expenditures constitute the only exogenous source of os-
cillations in the ﬁscal deﬁcit. Consider a decrease in the nominal devaluation rate.
This decrease must be accompanied by a fall in government consumption of non trad-
ables.1 This will lead to a relatively larger increase in the private consumption of
non tradables than of tradables. Since the model’s real exchange rate is a decreas-
ing function of the ratio of people’s consumption of tradables and non tradables, a
real depreciation of the domestic currency will take place, contrarily to the pattern
displayed in the data.
This paper has some other contributions. Obstfeld [29] states that it is essential to
consider how policies are selected to understand currency crises. Rebelo [32] makes
similar statements when discussing monetary stabilization. This research helps to
understand how the exchange rate policy is chosen.
Exchange rate devaluations are often viewed as a consequence of time consistency
1A companion paper shows that oscillations in the public expenditures on tradables will be fully
smoothed out through external borrowing and lending. Hence, a change in government consumption
of non tradables is required to generate a change in the optimal devaluation rate.
2problems, as in Obstfeld [29] and Giavazzi and Pagano [19]. In this essay, devaluations
are fully anticipated and are optimal choices for a government that can credibly
commit to a policy.
This research deviates from the approach usually found in the exchange rate crisis
literature. It does not rely on arbitrary loss functions for the government. It considers
all aﬀordable exchange rate policies, not only the pair ﬂoating-pegging.
The paper builds a bridge between two research ﬁelds that so far have been seeing
as completely apart. Today there is a large and growing body of literature on quan-
titative macroeconomic theory. Typical examples are the essays of Rebelo [32] and
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland [1]. On the other hand, there exist several studies that
rely on reduced form models to explain exchange rate devaluations. Obstfeld [29] and
Giavazzi and Pagano [19] are good examples of this investigation avenue. This paper
uniﬁes the two approaches.
The essay is organized as follows. A summary of the empirical evidence on ex-
change rate pegging and currency crisis is presented in section 2. The model is
described in section 3. Section 3.1 is devoted to the characterization of competitive
equilibria. The problem of selecting policies that lead to the best competitive equi-
librium is studied in section 3.2, along with the properties of this eﬃcient outcome.
The implications of the model will be compared to some business cycle stylized facts.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The Stylized Facts
This section summarizes some previous empirical research on currency pegging
and crisis. The available evidence points towards three major empirical regularities:
1. The implementation and collapse of pegging policies are worldwide recurrent
events.
2. An exchange rate pegging is accompanied by:
(a) an increase, relative to trend, in consumption and output;
(b) a deterioration in the current account;
(c) an increase in real wages;
(d) a real appreciation of the exchange rate;
(e) a reduction in the ﬁscal deﬁcit.
3. A currency crisis is followed by:
(a) a decrease, relative to trend, in consumption and output;
(b) a depreciation of the real exchange rate.
3The empirical work of Frankel and Rose [18], Klein and Marion [22], and Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin [27] will be brieﬂy reviewed. Each of these essays will be discussed
separately. Then, the available evidence will be summed up.
Frankel and Rose [18] used a sample of 104 countries, with annual data from 1971
to 1992. They deﬁned currency crash so that such an event is associated with a
depreciation of the domestic currency that is “large” in absolute terms and relative
to the previous devaluations. Namely, a currency crash occurred if (i) the nominal
exchange rate depreciated at least 25%, (ii) the depreciation rate increased at least
10% compared to the previous year’s value, and (iii) no other depreciation satisfying
the ﬁrst two requirements took place in the last three years. The latter constraint was
introduced to avoid double counting. That deﬁnition yielded 117 diﬀerent crashes.
Klein and Marion [22] considered monthly data for 17 Latin American countries
from the late 1950’s to the early 1990’s. They found 102 episodes in which a country
ﬁxed the exchange rate for at least a month. That averages six ﬁxing policies per
country. In a subset of 61 episodes,2 twelve countries ﬁxed the exchange rate at least
three times in the period.
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin [27] studied a sample of 144 countries from 1973 to 1994.
They adopted four diﬀerent notions of currency collapse. For the purpose of this essay,
it is enough to look at two of them, CRISIS3 and CRISIS4. The former requires (i)
a nominal depreciation of at least 15%, (ii) an increase in the devaluation rate of at
least 10% when compared to the previous year, (iii) a maximum devaluation of 10%
in the year before the crisis, and (iv) no other depreciation satisfying the ﬁrst three
conditions occurred in the last three years. These criteria yielded 136 exchange rate
collapses, with 58 taking place in Africa, 33 in Asia, 7 in Europe, and 38 in Latin
America. The concept of CRISIS4 requires (i) the exchange rate to be previously
ﬁxed, (ii) the currency to have depreciated in nominal terms at least 15%, and (iii)
no other depreciation satisfying the ﬁrst two requirements having taken place in the
last three years. This deﬁnition yielded 93 currency crises. Africa underwent 41, Asia
17, Europe 7, and Latin America 28.
That body of empirical evidence makes it clear that governments all around the
world often introduce an exchange rate policy (in extreme cases they ﬁx the exchange
rate) that will eventually be abandoned. After each collapse the government will
sooner or later resume intervention in the currency market.
The evidence provided by Kiguel and Liviatan [21] and Végh [35] will be also
reviewed. The conclusions of these studies are widely accepted to the point that
Rebelo [32] and Mendoza and Uribe [26] refer to the former authors’ ﬁndings as
stylized facts.
2The geographical distribution of those 61 episodes is presented in table 1 of Klein and Marion
[22]. The total ﬁgure of 102 ﬁxing events is mentioned shortly before that table. They do not provide
the distribution across countries of the remaining 41 episodes. However, the sample is composed of
17 countries. Thus, at least one of them ﬁxed the exchange rate several times.
4Kiguel and Liviatan [21] focused on 12 inﬂation stabilization programs that took
place in various countries: Argentina (5), Brazil (2), Chile (1), Israel (1), Mexico (1),
and Uruguay (2). These programs were spread over a period from 1959 to 1992. Half
of them ﬁxed the nominal exchange rate. The other half relied on a combination of
ﬁxing, periodical devaluations, preannounced devaluations or crawling peg. All of the
programs were eventually accompanied by an increase (relative to trend) in real GDP.
In ten programs there was a consumption boom. The current account deteriorated
in all programs. Real wages did not increase only in three. With one exception, all
programs were followed by a real exchange rate appreciation. Finally, ten programs
were accompanied by a reduction in the ﬁscal deﬁcit.
Végh [35] investigated ten of the twelve episodes studied by Kiguel and Liviatan
[21]. He concluded that devaluation, consumption, real exchange rate, and current
account followed the pattern described by the other two researchers.
Concerning exchange rate crisis and business cycle, Milesi-Ferretti and Razin [27]
found evidence that currency crises are followed by a growth slowdown for output
and consumption and a real depreciation of the domestic currency. Frankel and Rose
[18] also veriﬁed that output generally falls below the trend after an exchange rate
collapse.
3 The Economy
Consider a small country populated by a continuum of identical inﬁnitely lived
households with Lebesgue measure one and a government. A household is composed
by a shopper and a worker, who is endowed with one unit of time.
That country produces two non tradable goods. The ﬁrst is consumed by house-
holds (cN
1 ). The second is consumed by households (cN
2 ) and government (gN). The
country also produces a tradable good, which is consumed by households (cT)a n da
government (gT). This last good can also be exported (x)o ri m p o r t e d( −x).
Transactions take place in this economy in a particular way. At a ﬁrst stage of
each date t s p o tm a r k e t sf o rg o o d sa n dl a b o rs e r v i c e so p e r a t e .A tt h es e c o n ds t a g e ,
security and currency markets operate.
A domestic currency M circulates in this economy. Two types of securities are
traded: a claim B, with maturity of one period, to one unit of M and a claim B∗,
with the same maturity, to one unit of some foreign currency. Foreigners do not sell or
buy claims to the domestic currency. Government and residents can purchase and/or
sell the claims B∗ at an exogenous price, in terms of the foreign currency, q∗
t.
Workers cannot sell their services outside the country. Shoppers face a cash-in-
advance constraint. The purchases of cN
1 must be paid for with the domestic currency.
Except for the purchases of that good, all other transactions are liquidated during
the security and currency trading session. The date t price, in terms of the foreign
currency, of the tradable good is exogenous and equal to p∗
t.
5Technology is described by 0 ≤ yT ≤ θ
T(lT)αT
and 0 ≤ yN ≤ θ
N(lN)αN
, where yT
is the tradable output and lT is the amount of labor allocated to the production of
that good. A similar meaning is assigned to yN and lN.B o t hαT and αN lie in the
set (0,1].








t). The sequence {st}∞
t=0 is a stochastic process on
some probability space (Ω,F,P).E a c h st has a support contained in the ﬁnite set
S =Θ T × ΘN × GT × GN × P∗ × Q∗. These sets satisfy ΘT ⊂ R++, ΘN ⊂ R++,
GT ⊂ R+, GN ⊂ R++, P ∗ ⊂ R++,a n dQ∗ ⊂ (0,1). The object st stands for a history
(s0,...,st) of events and s∞ =( s0,s 1,...).T h es e t sSt and S∞ are standard Cartesian
products.
For a given st in St, µ(st) denotes the probability that the ﬁrst t realizations of
the process will be equal to st. The realization of st is known at the beginning of date
t.I fk ≤ t, µ(st|sk) denotes the conditional probability of st given sk; St(sk) is the set
of all st ∈ St such that the ﬁrst k events in st are equal to sk. In other words, St(sk)
is the set of all possible continuations of the history sk up to date t. Whenever there
is no danger of confusion, St(sk) will be denoted by St
k.A su s u a l ,{[a(st)]st∈St}∞
t=0 is
a history contingent sequence. Deﬁne








  .( 1 )
Each good is produced by a single competitive ﬁrm. Let l(st) denote the amount
of labor supplied by each household at date t if the history st occurs. Other variables

































The government ﬁnances the sequence {gT
t ,gN
t }∞
t=0 by issuing and withdrawing
the domestic currency; by issuing and redeeming claims B of maturity of one period
to one unit of the domestic currency; by purchasing and selling B∗; and taxing labor
income at a proportional tax τ. The date zero tax rate is exogenous and equal to
some value τ0. At other periods, that variable depends on the history st+1 but it




t,s t+1,¯ st+1 .( 3 )





























t) ,( 4 )
where pN(st), w(st) and q(st) are the respective date t monetary prices (in terms of
the domestic currency) of the non tradable good, labor services and the domestic
6claim; E(st) is the nominal exchange rate; B∗
G(st) stands for the foreign assets held
by the government at the end of date t; M(st) and B(st) are the amount of domestic
currency and public debt held by the households at the end of date t.A l l t h o s e
variables are conditional on the history of events. A negative value for B∗
G(st) means
that the government is borrowing abroad, while a negative value for B(st) means that
the government is lending to domestic residents. At t =0the government holds an
initial amount ¯ B∗
G of foreign assets. To avoid Ponzi schemes, a standard boundedness
constraint  B∗
G/p∗ ∞ ≤ A<∞ is imposed on the government foreign assets.
The function u : R3











2 )γ2(1 − l)γl 1−σ
1 − σ
,( 5 )
is the typical household period utility function. As usual, the γ’s are positive and



























































t) ,( 7 )
where B∗
H(st) stands for the foreign assets held by the household at the end of date
t if history st occurs and ψ
T(st) and ψ












t−1) .( 8 )
Given initial asset holdings ( ¯ M, ¯ B, ¯ B∗





t=0 to maximize (6) subject
to the constraints (7), (8), and l(st) ≤ 1.E x c e p t f o r B(st) and B∗
H(st),a l lt h o s e



















∞ < ∞ is imposed on the consumer problem.






























which is the balance-of-payments identity.
73.1 Competitive Equilibrium
A history contingent date t policy (E(st),p N(st),w(st),q(st),B∗
G(st),τ(st)) is de-
noted by ϕ(st).Apolicy is a history contingent sequence ϕ = {[ϕ(st)]st∈St}∞
t=0.D a t e
t history contingent allocations (cT(st),c N
1 (st),c N
2 (st),l(st),l N(st),l T(st),x(st)) and
asset holdings (M(st),B(st),B∗
H(st)) are denoted, respectively, by χ(st) and φ(st).
Additionally, χ = {[χ(st)]st∈St}∞
t=0 and φ = {[φ(st)]st∈St}∞
t=0.
Deﬁnition 1 A competitive equilibrium is an object (ϕ,χ,φ) that satisﬁes the follow-
ing properties: (i) given prices, (χ,φ) provides a solution for the household problem;
(ii) w(st)=pN(st)αNθ
N
t [lN(st)]αN−1 = E(st)p∗
tαTθ
T
t [lT(st)]αT−1; (iii) (2), (3), and
(4) hold.
The deﬁnition of competitive equilibrium does not place bounds on inﬂation.3 For
future reference, it is convenient to spell out a particular boundedness requirement.










The above condition prevents prices from increasing or decreasing “too much” in
a single period.
The government can pursue several distinct policies. To clarify this point, consider
the simple case in which the government has no source of revenue but inﬂation. For
simplicity, assume that at date zero the government has no net debt and the public
consumption is always positive. The government can balance its lifetime budget with
a constant inﬂation rate and borrow abroad to ﬁnance temporary imbalances. It is
also possible to balance the budget period by period solely with inﬂation tax. In this
case the inﬂation does not need to be constant. Diﬀerent policies will induce distinct
competitive equilibria. In this section a set of competitive equilibrium allocations will
be characterized. That will reduce the problem of selecting an eﬃcient policy to a
standard constrained maximization problem.
To simplify the notation, u(st), uT(st), u1(st), u2(st),a n dul(st) will denote,
respectively, the value of u and its partial derivatives ∂u/∂cT, ∂u/∂cN
1 , ∂u/∂cN
2 ,
and ∂u/∂l evaluated at the point (cT(st),c N
1 (st),c N
2 (st),l(st)). The auxiliary variable




































3Throughout this essay the term inﬂation will apply to the rate of increase in pN.
8There exist seven constraints with obvious economic meaning that must hold in































,( 1 1 )
which is simply the consolidation of all date t budget constraints of the households.

















,( 1 2 )
which requires imports to be ﬁnanced by the country’s initial wealth. The fourth
requirement, ensuring that people’s marginal rate of substitutions are consistent with













.( 1 3 )
The ﬁfth constraint is that households’ marginal rate of substitution between trad-
ables and non tradables must match the marginal rate of transformation between









t [lN(st)]1−αN .( 1 4 )
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,( 1 6 )
ensures that the allocations are consistent with τ0.
The above constraints are not enough to characterize a competitive equilibrium.























t)=0.( 1 9 )






















   
 
 
< ∞ .( 2 0 )




∞ < ∞. However, it is not
possible to characterize that condition for all competitive equilibria. Nevertheless,
it is possible to do so for all equilibria with bounded inﬂation. If the inﬂation is
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.( 2 2 )
As in deﬁnition 2, ε does not depend on the histories.
In a longer version of this essay, the following result was established.
Proposition 1 (a set of competitive equilibria) Let ¯ M>0.A na r r a yχ and a
price pN(s0) > 0 satisfy (2) and (11)-(22) if and only if they are components of a
competitive equilibrium (ϕ,χ,φ) of bounded inﬂation.
3.2 Ramsey Equilibrium
3.2.1 Deﬁnition and Characterization
As mentioned before, the concept of competitive equilibrium does not impose opti-
mality on the government behavior. In this section, a game in which the government
is a player will be considered.
At date zero, before markets open, the government announces that will follow a
policy ϕ. That policy cannot be changed in future dates (i.e., there is some commit-
ment device that allows the government to credible stick to ϕ). Then, private agents
10will be allowed to trade. The government is benevolent and will choose ϕ to maximize
(6).
Private agents actions depend on the prevailing policy. To keep track of that
relation, let f denote a generic function that maps a vector (st,ϕ) into the space of
the pairs (χ(st),φ(st)). As before, f(ϕ)={[f(st,ϕ)]st∈St}∞
t=0. Abusing the notation,




Deﬁnition 3 A Ramsey equilibrium is a pair (ϕ,f) satisfying: (i) for all ¯ ϕ, f(¯ ϕ)






tu(f(st, ¯ ϕ)) subject to (2), (4) and (3). A triple (ϕ,χ,φ) is a
Ramsey outcome if there exists a f such that (ϕ,f) is a Ramsey equilibrium and
f(ϕ)=( χ,φ).
Private agents are required to behave optimally for all policies, not only for the
equilibrium one. This requirement is a natural consequence of the game being studied.
When the government chooses ϕ it knows that people and ﬁrms will behave optimally,
no matter the chosen policy. So, government uses this information when choosing ϕ.
Note that this requirement is equivalent to subgame perfection, as pointed out by




t=0 is a stochastic process. Thus, the government problem
consists in choosing paths for money supply, domestic debt, external borrowing, and
tax rates to maximize people’s welfare. One can see this problem as a simpliﬁed
version of the problem faced by a benevolent government that takes the expenditures
as given and it is not able to design tax rates that are fully state contingent.
In a Ramsey equilibrium, the government chooses a policy that will maximize
people’s welfare. It is possible to characterize Ramsey outcomes through a standard
maximization problem. For this particular model, the result is stated below.


















subject to (2) and (11)-(16). If (pN(s0),χ) satisﬁes (17)-(22), then (pN(s0),χ) is a
component of some Ramsey outcome (ϕ,χ,φ).
3.2.2 Examples
In all incoming examples it is assumed that ¯ B = ¯ B∗
G = ¯ B∗
H =0 , s0 = a, τ0 = 20%,
p∗
t =1 , q∗
t = β and gT






t=0 is a Markov process on
the state set {a,b} with transition probabilities µab and µba. The period utility is
u =( cT)γT(cN
1 )γ1(cN
2 )γ2(1−l)γl. State space and transition probabilities are example
speciﬁc. A detailed explanation of how to compute the optimal allocations is provided
in a longer version of this essay.
11Example 1 (benchmark economy: the optimal policies) The current example






a =0 .05,a n dgN
b =0 .1. The transition probabilities are µab =0 .4 and µba =0 .7.
Let ˆ E denote the rate of devaluation of the nominal exchange rate. The optimal











if (st,s t+1)=( a,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( a,b);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,b).
Tax rates are roughly constant. Whenever the economy hits state b (the state with
higher government consumption) the domestic currency devaluates almost 21%, while
in state a the devaluation is close to 13.5%.
In the above example the consumption is higher in state a when compared to con-
sumption in state b. Output displays the opposite behavior. The empirical evidence
mentioned in section 2 states that in periods of higher devaluation both output and
consumption fall and in periods of pegging these two variables grow faster. Thus, ex-
ample 1 fails to reproduce some of the quantitative features found in the data. This
is a general feature of the model. An economy driven only by ﬁscal shocks cannot
account for all patterns found in the real data.
Several alternative policies could be implemented as a competitive equilibrium.
To illustrate some of these possibilities, three alternative policies will be presented
below.











if (st,s t+1)=( a,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( a,b);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,b);
can be implemented in the benchmark economy. The associated allocations satisfy
u1(st)=u2(st). This condition implies that the q(st)=1 , that is, the nominal interest
rate is zero. This is exactly the well known Friedman Rule.4
The fact that the Friedman Rule can be implemented in this economy but it is not
optimal is, at ﬁrst glance, surprising. The economy is a two sector cash-credit good
one. In an one sector cash-credit good closed economy environment the Friedman
Rule is known to be optimal.
An obvious reason, in this environment, to depart from the Friedman Rule is the
incomplete taxation feature. However, it is possible that it is not the only cause. For
4For a discussion of the Friedman Rule, see [11] or [17].
12instance, the optimality of the Friedman Rule would require, among other conditions,
that the consumption of tradable and non-tradable goods could be taxed at diﬀer-
ent rates — so that the implementability constraint (14) could be dropped from the
Ramsey problem.
Besides the Friedman Rule with constant tax rates, there are several other attain-
able policies. In example 3 the exchange rate is ﬁxed at whenever the economy hits
state a twice in a roll and devaluates 34% otherwise, while the labor income taxation
is constant at 20%. In example 4 there are no taxes on labor income and the exchange
rate devaluates 180% every period.











if (st,s t+1)=( a,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( a,b);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,b);
can be implemented in the benchmark economy.
Example 4 (benchmark economy: constant devaluation) The constant poli-
cies ˆ E(st+1)=1 8 0 .15% and τ(st+1)=0can be implemented in the benchmark
economy.
As previously mentioned, example 1 fails to reproduce all stylized facts listed in
section 2. In that example, consumption and output are negatively correlated and
the real exchange rate appreciates when the economy hits state b. However, a positive
correlation between consumption and output and a real depreciation in times of high
nominal devaluation (i.e., state b) are part of the stylized facts.
One of the goals of this section is to verify the ability of the Ramsey equilibrium
to reproduce the stylized facts. A secondary goal is to obtain a better understanding
of the properties of the optimal policies and the induced competitive equilibrium.
To achieve these two goals several experiments were performed. Some illustrative
examples will be reported below.
Example 5 (distinct transition probabilities) The economy is as in example 1,











if (st,s t+1)=( a,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( a,b);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,b).
Again, tax rates are roughly constant and the domestic currency devaluates more at
state a than at state b.
13A change in the transition probabilities aﬀects the present value of future govern-
ment expenditures. This is why optimal devaluation (as well as inﬂation rate) and tax
rates fall when compared to example 1. Another eﬀect is a change in the amplitude
of the devaluation oscillations. The qualitative behavior of the real variables was not
aﬀected. Similar results were found with other transition probabilities.
Example 6 (higher oscilation in gN) The economy is as in example 1, except
that gN
a =0and gN











if (st,s t+1)=( a,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( a,b);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,b).
Once more, tax rates are roughly constant and the domestic currency devaluates more
at state a than at state b.
T h em a j o re ﬀ e c to fa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ev a r i a t i o no fgN is to increase the oscillation
in the devaluation rate of the domestic currency. The behavior of the real variables
is the same as in example 1.
Example 7 (an economy driven only by technological shocks) The economy
is identical to the one in example 1, except that gN
a = gN
b =0 .075, θ
N
a =1 .2,a n d
θ
N











if (st,s t+1)=( a,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( a,b);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,b).
Once more, tax rates are roughly constant and the domestic currency devaluates more
at state a than at state b.
Devaluation rate behaves as in example 1. As in that example, the ratio
gN
θN is
higher in state b than in state a. So, the relative higher public expenditures will lead
to higher devaluation whenever the economy hits state b.
Despite the similar behavior of the exchange rate devaluation, the real variables
display diﬀerent qualitative patterns when compared to example 1. In the above
example, both consumption and output are higher at state a than at state b.H e n c e ,
those two variables are positively correlated.
An economy driven only by productivity shocks will display a positive correlation
between consumption and output. However, this class of economy does not perform
well at quantitative level. In example 7 the exchange rate oscillates at most 16 percent
points and the output may increase or decrease 30%. Oscillations of this order in the
output are too high.
14Example 7 illustrates the main problem with an economy driven only by techno-
logical shocks. A sizable oscillation in the exchange rate devaluation will require an
implausible high oscillation in the output.
The experiments performed so far suggest that a combination of negatively cor-
related ﬁscal and technological shocks is required to mimic all stylized facts. The
behavior of an economy that is driven by this type of shocks is discussed below.
Example 8 (technological and ﬁscal shocks) Transition probabilities are µab =
0.4 and µba =0 .7. The state space is described by gN
a =0 , gN









b =0 .95. Thus, except for the state space the economy is exactly











if (st,s t+1)=( a,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( a,b);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,a);
if (st,s t+1)=( b,b).
Tax rates are approximately constant. As before, the nominal exchange rate devalu-
ates more at state a than at state b.
The behavior of the real variables in example 8 mimics several of the stylized facts
listed in section 2. Consider a history st in which the last three events are equal to
(a,a,b).A td a t et the rate of devaluation jumps from 5.5% to 28.2%. Consumption
falls 30%, while the GDP decreases by 2%. The real exchange rate appreciates.
Similar facts are observed at histories that end with (b,a,b).5
Consider a history in which the last three events are equal to (b,b,a).A t d a t e
t the rate of devaluation falls from 29.9% to 6.87%. Consumption increases by 48%
and GDP grows by 2%. The real exchange rate depreciates. The current account
reverts from a surplus to a deﬁcit. Similar facts are observed at histories that end
with (a,b,a).
Except for the behavior of the real exchange rate, the above example matches the
stylized facts associated with both currency crises and pegging episodes. The reason
for that relative failure of the present model will be discussed next. Consider a pegging
episode. The main reason for the counter factual comportment of the real exchange
rate in example 8 is the composition in the ﬁscal contraction. A minor reduction in
gN should be accompanied by a large increase in the government revenue. In the last
example the tax rate is roughly constant and the government revenue, as a percentage
of the GDP, turns out to be roughly constant. Hence, all ﬁscal contraction (which
is required to generate a large oscillation in the domestic currency devaluation rate)
must take place by means of a decrease in gN.N o w ,r e c a l lt h a tcN
1 + cN
2 + gN = yN.
5Of course, histories ending with either (a,a,b) or (b,a,b) are associated with currency crashes.
Histories ending with either (b,b,a) or (a,b,a) are associated with the introduction of a currency
pegging. The other possible histories are not associated with either a crash or a pegging.
15The fall in gN will generate an increase in both cN
1 and cN
2 . On the other hand, a real
exchange rate appreciation requires a fall in the ratio
cN
2
cT . But the large fall in gN will
lead to a percent increase in cN
2 larger than the one in cT. So, the real exchange rate
will depreciate instead of appreciating.
It is an interesting exercise to consider which extension of the present model could
correct the counter factual behavior of the real exchange rate. A promising approach
consists in allowing gN to be produced in another sector. Observe that in the model
studied in this paper the marginal rate of transformation between private and public
consumption of non-tradables is constant. Thus, the increase in private consumption
that takes place when gN falls is composed mostly by an increase in the private
consumption of non-tradables.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Governments often choose to pursue exchange rate policies that are later aban-
doned. This essay shows that this pattern of behavior is eﬃcient. A government
that cares about people’s welfare will allow the rate of devaluation of the domestic
currency to respond to random shocks that strike the economy.
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin [27] showed that a currency crisis is often followed by a
drop below the trend of consumption and output and a real exchange rate deprecia-
tion. Kiguel and Liviatan [21] and Végh [35] provided evidence that when a country
pegs the exchange rate, the opposite facts plus a current account deterioration take
place.
Ideally, any model aimed at explaining the implementation and collapse of ex-
change rate regimes should reproduce these stylized facts. This essay succeeds in
replicating most of that set of empirical regularities.
To understand the driving forces behind the selection of exchange rate policies,
this paper studied the problem of choosing optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy with
commitment in a context of exogenous government consumption and incomplete tax
rates. The main ﬁnding is that the optimal devaluation rate is correlated in a pos-
itive way with government consumption and in a negative way with technological
shocks. Hence, as the economy is hit by random shocks in those variables, the rate
of devaluation of the domestic currency oscillates.
The optimal devaluation policy features have a simple justiﬁcation. In periods
of high public consumption, a benevolent government would like to increase the tax
revenue. If the ﬁscal policy is not fully state contingent, the only remaining means
to raise additional tax revenue is through inﬂation tax. As inﬂation rises, so does
the devaluation rate. A negative technological shock will lead to a fall in output.
Thus, the ratio between ﬁscal deﬁcit and output will rise. Again, the government’s
willingness to raise additional revenue explains why the devaluation is higher when
there is a bad technology draw.
16The model studied here is a much simpler version of those usually found in the
literature on exchange rate based stabilizations. The economy lacks capital accu-
mulation and the monetary friction was introduced by means of a cash-in-advance
constraint. The study of optimal policies in a more sophisticated environment is an
obvious possibility for future research.
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